“Court Martial”: A Legal Drama That (Mostly) Holds Up—A Plot That Doesn’t

Lawyering has ruined most legal dramas for me.

While I don’t expect Hollywood to mirror legal practice like a documentary, most legal dramas are so unrealistic that my suspension of disbelief files a motion to withdraw.

The need for dramatic flair and snappy pacing can outrank strict legal realism, but push it too far, and the whole courtroom fantasy collapses like a poorly argued motion.

This is true for even Star Trek legal drama, though I have been a Trekkie since I was eight years old. With that in mind, let’s dive into the original series episode “Court Martial.”

I’ll touch on plenty of things along the way, but the spotlight is the core legal drama.

Plot synopsis.

In the Star Trek: The Original Series episode “Court Martial,” the Enterprise returns to Starbase 11 after an ion storm in which Captain Kirk reports the death of Lt. Cmdr. Ben Finney.

A routine inquiry escalates when the ship’s computer logs appear to show that Kirk prematurely jettisoned a research pod—supposedly with Finney still inside—contradicting Kirk’s sworn account that the ship was already at red alert. Kirk is charged with perjury and negligent homicide and is ordered to stand trial before a Starfleet court‑martial panel.

The prosecution is led by Lt. Areel Shaw, an accomplished Starfleet attorney. In a stroke of impeccable ethics, she is (of course) Kirk’s former romantic partner—with red-hot lingering mutual chemistry. Nothing says “zealous advocate” like having a prosecutor—borrowing her own phrasing—slapping down hard her ex she is still hot for.

Spoiler Alert: As the trial unfolds, the defense uncovers that Finney is alive and hiding aboard the Enterprise, having sabotaged the ship’s systems to frame Kirk. Once Finney is found and the sabotage reversed, Kirk is fully exonerated and restored to command.

Legal drama to the tenth power.

No commentary on this episode would be complete without mentioning its comically bad math. During an evidentiary showdown, Kirk attempts to explain how the Enterprise computer can isolate and amplify background noise. In doing so, he proudly notes that the system can magnify white noise “one to the fourth power.”

Of course, mathematically speaking, 14 = 1. So, the supposedly impressive “magnification” he’s describing would… do absolutely nothing.

While the episode’s numerical slipups are amusing, we are focusing on legal drama and   how convincingly Court Martial portrays a functioning judicial system.

Let lawyers do the lawyering.  

Would you hire a navy captain to represent you in court, or an airline pilot write your will? No? How strange.

Yet Star Trek frequently insists that starship officers are also learned and skilled litigators. But, thankfully not in “Court Martial.”

In this episode we learn that Starfleet has made the radical decision to have attorneys (of all people!) staff a dedicated JAG Corp, where prosecutor Lt. Areel Shaw works.

Kirk hires an honest-to-goodness private attorney, who has developed his lawyering skills with decades of actual courtroom experience instead of recalibrating sensors.

Imagine that—letting lawyers do the lawyering. Truly groundbreaking stuff.

This makes far more sense than, say, that Next Generation gem where Starfleet apparently can’t spare two JAG officers for a high‑stakes, widely anticipated legal hearing. Riker ends up prosecuting one of his best friends (but don’t worry, he was ordered to be unbiased, so that fixes everything). Picard meanwhile moonlights as litigation attorney in between saving the galaxy.

That episode is quite popular, but makes me cringe. More on that circus in another post. For now, credit where it’s due: “Court Martial” at least remembers that attorneys exist and should probably be the ones litigating cases.

What a concept!

Stellar conflict of interest.

Would you hire a lawyer who once dated—and still has emotional ties to—the person you’re fighting in court?

Yet, as noted earlier, the prosecutor is one of Captain Kirk’s (many) former flames—and the episode makes it abundantly clear that the sparks are still very much alive.

The writers wanted to raise the emotional stakes, but for me it overshoots the mark. She would have to recuse herself immediately, and if she didn’t, Starfleet’s ethics committee would slap her down hard.

Yes, the tribunal asks Kirk at the outset whether he objects to her serving as prosecutor, which tidies things up a bit, but only a bit.

As the New Hampshire Bar Association put it in a formal ethics opinion, “intimate relationships, current or prospective, including dating—are likely to require disclosure…and perhaps disqualification even if the parties do not object.”

And really, why would Kirk object? Her bias runs in his favor.

The real issue is how she’s supposed to zealously represent her client—Starfleet—when she’s still carrying a torch (and possibly a phaser‑hot crush) for the opposing party.

“What’s the matter? Don’t you like books?”

When I was in law school and through the early years in my career, older attorneys kept a library stacked with hard copy books—case reporters, Shepard’s, and legal encyclopedias like  AmJur and CJS.

I remember hearing older attorneys bemoan that they did not know how to turn on a computer, or that they did not know how to use electronic filing when courts began to require all attorneys to use it.

Decades before Westlaw or LexisNexis, Star Trek writers Don Mankiewicz and Stephen W. Carabatsos offered a remarkably prescient look at this digital divide by introducing Captain Kirk’s eccentric attorney, Samuel T. Cogley.

Cogley’s adamant refusal to use a computer—which he disparaged as "homogenized, pasteurized, synthesized"—mirrors the real-world resistance many veteran practitioners felt during the late 20th and early 21st-century shift from physical law libraries to digital research and filing.

It may seem a bit dated now as the transformation to digital has already occurred and we still have a long wait to see the 23rd century, but it is amusing to hear the debate I witnessed play out in real life. And I admire the writers’ foreseeing it way back in the 1960s.

By filling Kirk’s quarters with plies of physical books, Cogley didn't just provide a visual contrast to the high-tech 23rd century. His stubborn adherence to analogue anachronisms embodies the episode’s warning against blindly trusting technology. This is further underscored by the writers’ foreseeing what we would now call deep fakes.

“But that’s not what happened.”

The episode nails the idea of manufactured electronic evidence decades before it became a real‑world problem.

The chief piece of evidence against Kirk is the ship’s audio/visual computer log that depicts Kirk jettison the pod prematurely, thus apparently dooming Finney. This leads to the charges that Kirk acted with criminal negligence and committed perjury in his official report on the incident.

Upon seeing the computer log Kirk exclaims, “But that’s not what happened.”

Spock beats the ship’s computer at chess, when it should have only been possible to achieve a draw at best. This leads Spock to deduce that someone altered the computer’s programming code, inadvertently corrupting the chess coding, too.

Only three people on board the Enterprise could have altered the computer records in this fashion—Spock, Kirk, and Finney. Spoiler alert—Spock did not frame his captain, and Kirk did not frame himself, so even when watching for the first time, if you don’t guess who the culprit was then I’m afraid you would flunk Starfleet Academy.

This is reminiscent of (and consistent with) dialogue in the episode “Menagerie” where the Enterprise received a phantom message from Starbase 11 ordering it to divert there (the same star base as in “Court Martial”) but no such message was ever sent. Kirk surmises that someone with the right technical expertise could make a message “say anything, or say nothing” but cannot accept that Spock would have created a phantom message.

Again, the original series is good at anticipating the dark possibilities faked computer records present today. We already live in a world where someone can create electronic records purporting to show someone doing or saying anything, or nothing.

A real‑world case underscores how dangerous fabricated digital evidence can be. In one instance, an estranged spouse manufactured computer records to make it appear that her husband possessed child pornography. He did not.

He ultimately cleared his name only after retaining highly specialized—and costly—computer forensics experts. It’s a terrifying reminder that, unlike an affluent person or a ship’s company with a top-notch science officer, not everyone has the resources to mount that kind of defense, even when the truth is on their side.

In an ironic footnote, the forensics firm issued a press release quoting Melvin Belli, a well‑known trial lawyer. Belli appeared as a villain in the original Star Trek episode “And the Children Shall Lead.”

The trial

Starfleet does not call any of its own witnesses. By its own witnesses I mean witnesses not biased for Kirk. While a lawyer might call hostile witnesses, it would be weird for the prosecutor to call no witnesses of her own.

I am pretty forgiving here, though. It would be tedious and distracting to introduce, for example, a computer expert to testify at trial for Starfleet and then vanish from the stage.

Better to give characters we already care about like Spock and McCoy more screen time than to stick rigidly to legal realism. Artistic license must sometimes take the lead over replicating a legit courtroom experience.

The first witness is Spock. While Vulcans famously cannot lie, they can certainly be loyal. Spock shades his testimony in favor of Kirk, which of course the prosecutor would anticipate and is why in a real trial he is unlikely to be called as the prosecutor’s first witness—assuming he would be called by the prosecutor at all (as opposed to being cross-examined after testifying for Kirk).

The prosecutor scores points with Spock’s testimony. Spock concedes that he found no glitch in the ship’s computer that would explain why the log might be wrong (though that will change later in the plot).

He also admits that he was preoccupied at the moment the pod was jettisoned. His testimony that Kirk could not have acted criminally is therefore mere speculation.

Spock postulates that if “I let go of a hammer on a planet that has a positive gravity, I need not see it fall to know that it has in fact fallen.” Circumstantial evidence is admissible in  court and is just as valid as direct evidence—contrary to common opinion. “The law does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of their weight or value in finding the facts in this case. One is not necessarily more or less valuable than the other.”—Washington Pattern Jury Instructions 1.03.

Spock’s main argument is essentially: Kirk would never do that; it’s just not who he is—it would be out of character.

Character evidence is usually not admissible. “Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 404.

Spock admits that his conclusion is mere opinion, not based on direct observation. Opinion testimony is allowed in some circumstances.

Any witness can give opinion testimony about things within common knowledge that they observed—the estimated speed of a vehicle, the approximate age of someone they saw, the approximate distance between two points or time between two events, etc. But, Spock again is talking about Kirk’s character, not common knowledge.

An expert may give opinion within the scope of their field, but Spock is not talking about the ship’s computer or some scientific principle when saying Kirk would never do it.

Expert testimony and its limits are also at play in McCoy’s testimony.

McCoy is a doctor, damn it, not a psychiatrist. 

McCoy gets pulled into giving a hypothetical opinion about whether humans hold grudges. The prosecutor’s theory is that Kirk secretly hated Finney because Kirk sensed Finney still resented the discipline Kirk imposed on him years earlier.

There are two legal problems with the prosecutor’s questioning of McCoy.

The computer reads into the court record McCoy’s status as ship’s surgeon.  The prosecutor then asks McCoy to admit he is an expert in space psychology. He denies this, and merely states “I know something about it.”

This is no legal foundation for him to testify as an expert in psychology.

McCoy is a medical officer assigned to a spaceship, so it makes sense he would know something about “space psychology.” Having some familiarity with human psychology doesn’t make him an expert in the field. Courts draw these lines all the time.

In Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., for example, the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of an engineer’s testimony—not because he wasn’t qualified to testify about engineering topics within his scope, but because he lacked experience with the specific type of “reverse engineering” at issue. Expertise is not a universal passport.

McCoy might in fact be qualified to testify about psychology. This is hinted at in other episodes—“Doomsday Machine”, “The Enemy Within”, “The Conscience of the King”, “Dagger of the Mind”, “The Corbomite Maneuver”, just to name a few.

But, trial is about evidence accepted by the court and forming part of the official record. Here, the foundation of McCoy testifying as an expert in psychology was not established on the record in trial.

Second, the prosecutor is essentially asking McCoy whether people tend to resent someone who resents them. That’s not expert testimony; that’s Tuesday. Evidence rules require expert opinions to be based on “reliable principles and methods” and “sufficient facts or data,” not on everyday common sense.

In Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central National Ins. Co. the appellate court held that a state trooper shouldn’t have been allowed to give an opinion about whether a defendant tried to elude him. The jury could figure that out on its own, and the trooper’s opinion wandered outside his actual expertise. Even qualified experts can’t testify to matters beyond their lane.

While these cases are from Washington State, they reflect general evidence rules followed by most jurisdictions.

In short: based on the record at this trial, McCoy shouldn’t be offering an expert opinion on something outside his specialty—especially when the “expertise” in question is really just common human experience.

In reality, the parties often simply stipulate to an expert’s resume. The prosecution offers to stipulate to Kirk’s credentials, for good reason.

Kirk’s resume

At the 2002 PGA Tour Championship the emcee introduced Tiger Woods. “Winner of thirty-four PGA tour events, including” this event and that event and another and another— “All right, all right” Phil Mkelson cut in to uproarious laughter from everyone, including Tiger Woods.

In “Court Martial”, as the computer drones out Kirk’s resume, the prosecutor wisely offers to stipulate to Kirk’s qualifications. Kirk’s attorney objects, because he wants to bolster Kirk’s credentials and prestige, and thus his credibility. The tribunal allows Kirk’s attorney to formally qualify his witness.

This mirrors real world trials. Consider this exchange from an actual trial:

Defense Attorney: Judge, I would stipulate to his expertise.

THE COURT: I'm sure you will.

Defense Attorney: We will. We've heard it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So have I, but the jury has not.

Hunt v. State, 474 Md. 89, 252 A.3d 946 at 964 (Md. App. 2021).

Qualifying a witness can bolster their credibility. But don’t overdo it.

“It is a mistake, however, to think that more qualifications are necessarily more persuasive. And endless repetition of degrees, publications, and awards, and appointments may easily overload a judge or juror’s ability, not to mention desire, to pay careful attention to the witness.” Lubet, Steven. Modern Trial Advocacy Analysis & Practice (4th ed.). National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 2009.

Cogley declines the offer to stipulate, but before the litany of Kirk’s accolades reaches overload, he cuts it off. “I think that’s enough. I wouldn’t want to slow things up too much.”

“[E]xpert qualifications are notoriously boring, and most judges will jump at the chance to move things along by allowing the introduction of a resume” instead of droning testimony. “For the same reason, it is common for counsel to stipulate to the introduction of the resumes of all expert witnesses.” Lubet, Steven. Modern Trial Advocacy Analysis & Practice (4th ed.). National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 2009.

Counsel introducing the expert witness will try to strict the right balance. “The expert’s resume should rarely be used as a complete substitute for examination on qualifications since this would deprive counsel of the opportunity to emphasize the witness’s most compelling virtues.” Lubet, Steven. Modern Trial Advocacy Analysis & Practice (4th ed.). National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 2009.

While in the real world this would likely have mostly—if not entirely—all been worked out in advance, “Court Martial” captures the essence here. A-plus grade on depicting qualifying Kirk as an expert on operations of a starship.

Whether the best witness for these points would be the defendant giving self-serving testimony is another matter—but leeway must be given in a one-hour drama.

Not the Code of Hammurabi Again.

Somewhere over the years I came across a cartoon of a lawyer droning endlessly to a jury while the judge, eyes skyward, thinks, “Oh no, not the Code of Hammurabi again!”

That image came rushing back to me watching Kirk’s attorney in “Court Martial” reach for maximum gravitas by citing—of course—the Code of Hammurabi. And not just that. He rattles off the Bible, the Code of Justinian, Magna Carta, the U.S. Constitution, and even future legal milestones like the Fundamental Declarations of the Martian Colonies and the Statutes of Alpha Three.

It’s a grand tour of legal history but trial practice treatises argue that even “closing argument is not the time for flowery speeches festooned with quotations from famous people or books and intended to demonstrate the skill of the advocate at making a memorable speech.” Hon. Herbert Jay Stern, Trying Cases to Win, American Bar Association (1985).

After his dramatic monologue, Cogley doesn’t simply ask the judge to grant his request—he bellows, “I demand it. I DEMAND IT!!” In reality, if a judge denies your request, you don’t shout louder. You file an appeal like everyone else.

Hollywood loves fiery fist-pounding theatrics. Judges do not.

Years ago, I was waiting my turn in a crowded courtroom when two lawyers argued a motion.

One spoke so quietly I could barely hear him from the back. No theatrics, no arm-waving—just calm, clear reasoning.

The other lawyer performed like he was auditioning for a courtroom drama, complete with sweeping gestures and histrionics. The people sitting near me loved the show and whispered praise.

The quiet lawyer won. The showman lost. Yet as they left the courtroom, the spectators asked the showman for his business card.

Call me crazy, but I would have asked for the card of the attorney who won.

Hearing reconvened on the Enterprise bridge.

After Spock determines through his chess experiment that someone has tampered with the computer, Kirk’s attorney requests the trial reconvene on the Enterprise. In the events that follow, both the Enterprise and the legal drama nearly crash.

On the Enterprise an experiment is conducted to discover if Finney is alive and still hiding onboard. Both are large assumptions.

There are a lot of problems here, both in terms of legal drama and general storytelling.

It is axiomatic that a good lawyer asks only questions that he already knows the answers to.  Yet Kirk’s attorney has Kirk, Spock, and McCoy use technology on just a hunch that Finney is alive, and that he is still aboard the Enterprise.

A trial is not the place for gumshoe detective work. It feels rather forced to test the theory that Finney is still alive (and still hiding aboard ship—another huge assumption) for the first time on the record in trial.

The more sensible approach would be to ask for a continuance to investigate further given the late discovered evidence—evidence that Kirk and his legal counsel could not have known about or discovered earlier.

Moreover, what was Finney’s plan? Was he planning to live there forever, surviving on replicator rations and spite like an interstellar Phantom of the Opera?

Finney was hiding in engineering for days without anyone noticing. Does he not need to come out to find food? Use the bathroom?

Why had he not already snuck off the ship? Or, when Kirk orders everyone off the ship, why not stealthily slip away with the crowd?

Would it not make more sense for Kirk to issue a strict orders that no one is to leave the ship? To order everyone on the ship to be on the lookout for Finney and to send out a large-scale red-shirted search party?

As any drama builds to a climax, the pace accelerates and often realism must give a little. In legal drama I can be much more forgiving near the end of the story if lines are blurred for pacing and flare. Still, taken too far it all breaks down, which I am afraid happens in “Court Martial” once trial reconvenes aboard the Enterprise.

Backing up a bit, kudos on something they got very right earlier in the trial that almost all legal dramas get wrong.

Direct your comments to the bench.

One thing the writers got very right was the reaction of the bench when the lawyers started bickering directly with each other.

Most legal dramas treat attorney‑to‑attorney sniping like it’s mandatory—two lawyers circling each other like Klingons in a Bat’leth tournament while the judge just shrugs. In reality, no judge is letting counsel turn the well into a barroom. The moment lawyers start addressing each other instead of the court, the bench steps in with the subtlety of a red alert.

That’s why “Court Martial” feels refreshingly accurate. The second the attorneys start trading personal jabs, the judge cuts them off with a crisp “Direct your comments to the bench,” which is exactly what a real judge would do—minus the Starfleet uniform and the dramatic lighting. It’s a tiny moment, but it shows the writers actually understood courtroom procedure.

And honestly, it makes the scene better. Real courtroom tension isn’t two lawyers yelling at each other like they’re about to reenact the Kirk‑Spock fight from “Amok Time.” It’s two lawyers trying not to yell at each other while the judge watches them like a Vulcan evaluating their logic. The lawyering chess match is the drama. And for once, a TV courtroom remembered that.

Final Report Card

“Court Martial” earns a B+ as legal drama.

Actual lawyers do the lawyering. Judges cut off lawyers who bicker with each other. While compromise is made to get main characters screen time and for pacing, that is expected. This is legal drama, not legal documentary.

Even the ongoing conflict‑of‑interest problem (which the script blithely ignores from start to finish) can’t fully sink the strong courtroom beats. Someone in the writers’ room clearly cared about getting the vibe of the legal ecosystem right.

But then we reach the final act and the Enterprise losing orbit is a perfect metaphor for the sinking quality of the episode. The realistic legal framework that felt so grounded earlier suddenly evaporates, plot gymnastics strain credulity, and we even get farcical math to the tenth power.

So overall, it lands at a C. Not because it’s unwatchable—far from it—but because the final act loses both courtroom and real-world credibility entirely and sprints into a wall with its shoelaces untied.

Still, for a 1967 attempt at a starship legal thriller, it’s earnest, ambitious, and occasionally brilliant. When it works, it really works. When it doesn’t… well, let’s just say the structural‑integrity fields were not at 100 percent.

Landlord's Motives

Do the Landlord’s Motives Matter Legally?

I recently saw headlines about the Jam Master Jay murder case saying a conviction was overturned because prosecutors couldn’t prove a motive. That stood out to me, because in most criminal cases, motive isn’t something the law actually requires. To convict someone of murder, prosecutors have to prove intent — not why the person did it. Despite what TV courtroom dramas love to show, motive is optional.

Prosecutors still like to offer a motive because it helps a jury make sense of the story. If jurors think the accused had a reason, they’re more likely to believe they did it. If there’s no clear reason, the case can feel confusing. But legally, motive isn’t a required element.

The Jam Master Jay case was different. The defendant was charged under a federal law that makes murder a more serious crime if it’s connected to drug trafficking. To prove that connection, prosecutors tried to show a drug‑related motive. The court said they didn’t prove it — and without that link, they couldn’t show the murder was tied to drug trafficking at all

In a much less dramatic way than a criminal case, a landlord’s motive can matter—or not—depending on the situation. Here are a few examples under Washington law.

Ending a tenancy without cause

Residential landlords in Washington can no longer end a month‑to‑month tenancy “just because.” They need a legally recognized reason. They may be able to end a tenancy at the end of a fixed‑term lease, but only in certain situations and with 60 days’ notice.

Commercial landlords, on the other hand, can end a tenancy regardless of motive.

Ending a tenancy based on the intent to sell or move in

A residential landlord can end a month‑to‑month tenancy—or choose not to renew a lease—if they genuinely intend to sell the property or move in as their primary residence. But they can’t cut a lease short, even if they suddenly need the home.

The keyword here is genuine. A tenant could challenge the landlord’s stated intent if there’s evidence it’s a sham, though it’s usually hard to do that ahead of time.

Once the tenant moves out, the landlord generally has 90 days to actually sell or move in. That 90‑day window isn’t a strict deadline—it’s a presumption. If a landlord moves in for exactly 90 days and then immediately moves out, a court might see that as proof the original intent wasn’t real. There’s no magic number of days that guarantees safety; what matters is whether the landlord truly meant what they claimed.

At the same time, there are plenty of legitimate reasons a landlord might miss the 90‑day mark—major repairs, renovations, medical emergencies, and so on. If the landlord can show a real reason for the delay, they’re not automatically liable for wrongful eviction.

Retaliatory motive

One motive that always matters is retaliation. A landlord can’t punish a tenant for exercising their rights—like asking for repairs or contacting a government agency.

If a landlord raises rent or tries to end the tenancy within 90 days of the tenant asserting a legal right, the law presumes the landlord is retaliating. It’s not a hard rule, but it does shift the burden. And even outside that 90‑day window, suspicious timing can still cause problems.


This is just a quick overview of how landlord motive plays into Washington landlord‑tenant law. It’s not legal advice. If you need guidance for your specific situation, feel free to contact our office.

The Rent is Too Damned…Fixed?

Landlord use of AI to set rent rates has spawned a wave of new laws and litigation. Critics urge that use of AI products by companies like Yardi Systems, Inc. and RealPage, Inc. are nothing short of high-tech collusion to fix prices.

The American Economic Liberties Project (“AELP”), launched in 2020, is a non-profit and non-partisan organization devoted to “translate the intellectual victories of the anti-monopoly movement into momentum towards concrete, wide-ranging policy changes that begin to address today’s crisis of concentrated economic power.”

According to court documents filed by RealPage, AELP “began to peddle the groundless claim, based in large measure on demonstrably false factual assertions, that rising rents across the country were caused not by insufficient housing supply, but instead by software tools offered by services like RealPage.”

In July 2024 San Francisco banned algorithmic rental price setting. Other cities in California, Washington, Oregon, New York, New Jersey,  Pennsylvania, and around the county followed and passed similar legislation banning or limited the use of algorithmic rental price setting.

The AI rental companies have fought back, sometimes successfully.

RealPage sued the City of Berkeley claiming that its ban on “coordinated pricing algorithm” software, a law targeting apps like those sold by Yardi and RealPage, is an unconstitutional ban on free speech. RealPage in its complaint filed in the US District Court in California  argues that rent increase are a function of supply and demand, and denies that its software app facilitates price-fixing.

In response, the City of Berkeley paused implementation of the pricing algorithm ban until March 1, 2006.  A settlement may be forthcoming. According to a Joint Status Report signed by both parties and filed with the court November 26, 2025, the parties “are making substantial progress toward a final resolution in the form of amendments to the Ordinance, which they expect will be finalized in the coming weeks.” The parties are to file another status report by January 15, 2026.

RealPage’s competitor Yardi successfully argued in California state court that its software does not share nonpublic information between different landlords, and there is no agreement, neither explicitly nor implicitly, between competitors to set prices through use of its software.

On October 20, 2025, the court dismissed the case against Yardi after it disclosed its source code and the plaintiffs could not refute Yardi’s expert who opined that the software does not illegally share information between competitors nor require any agreement to set prices.

Just a month later, on November 24, Yardi filed a motion for summary judgment in an anti-trust case brough against it federal district court in Seattle. In its summary judgment motion Yardi quotes the California court’s order, “The undisputed evidence is that no one is agreeing or cooperating with the sharing of commercially sensitive rental prices in order to get price recommendations. The owners/managers are not giving anything to their competitors through Yardi, and they are not getting a price recommendation that is based on pricing data provided to Yardi by their competitors.”

Yardi’s summary judgment motion in Seattle is still pending at the time of this writing.

In August 2024 the federal government and ten state governments filed and anti-trust suit against RealPage and several large landlord companies. A proposed settlement was reached and filed with the US District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina November 24, 2025.

Under the settlement RealPage agrees to restrictions on the functionality of its software. The court will appoint a formal monitor to ensure compliance with the terms of the settlement. RealPage agrees to cooperate with and bear the cost of the court-appointed monitor.

At a time when both affordability and the use of artificial intelligence technology are at the forefront continued legislation and litigation concerning the use of artificial intelligence algorithms in setting rent prices can be expected.

US Court of Appeals Holds CDC Eviction Moratorium Likely Invalid

In September 2020 the Center for Disease Control (CDC) issued a nation-wide eviction moratorium,  citing generic rulemaking authority under the Public Health Service Act. The same month, landlords in Tennessee filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the CDC eviction moratorium exceeded statutory authority.

The Public Health Service Act statute authorizes the CDC Director to provide for “inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.” The CDC based its authority to supersede state law and halt evictions nation-wide on the “other measures” catchall.

Later, Congress extended the CDC eviction moratorium from December 31 to January 31. On January 29, the CDC extended the eviction moratorium through March 31, relying again on the generic catchall as authority.

The federal district court ruled that the CDC had exceeded its statutory authority. The government appealed and moved for a stay on the district court’s order.[1] The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the government was unlikely to prevail on the merits, and denied the motion.[2]

The Court reasoned that as the “other measures” catchall comes at the end of a list of specific items, the “other measures” catchall must be construed to be of the same nature as the specified items like “inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination” and so on. “Plainly, government intrusion on property to sanitize and dispose of infected matter is different in nature from a moratorium on evictions.”

The Court noted that regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship has historically always been the province of the states, and the Court would not read the statute as granting the CDC power to insert itself in a traditional area of state law without “some clear, unequivocal textual evidence of Congress’s intent to do so.” The Court cited an “ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”

The government argued that since other provisions of the Public Health Service Act allow the CDC to enforce quarantines, the “other measures” catchall must be read broadly to include things like quarantine. The Court conceded that this argument has “cosmetic appeal” but concluded that it does not hold up to scrutiny. The Court reasoned that the provision the government relied upon dealt with limited power to restrict liberty by imposing quarantines. The “other measures” language is found in provisions dealing with property interest, and an eviction moratorium is radically different from the types of property interests listed there.

The government also argued that when Congress legislatively extended the CDC eviction moratorium it acknowledged that the statute authorized the moratorium. The Court noted that nothing in the congressional act expressly approved the CDC’s interpretation, and “mere congressional acquiescence in the CDC’s assertion” of statutory authority “does not make it so, especially given that the plain text indicates otherwise.”

The Court found the government unlikely to prevail on the merits, and accordingly denied the motion for a stay on the district court’s order.

[1] Tiger Lily, LLC v. US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (6th Cir. No. 21-5256).

[2] See https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0074p-06.pdf

Texas Federal Judge Hold CDC Moratorium Unconstitutional

A federal judge in Texas has held the Centers for Disease Control eviction moratorium unconstitutional.[1]

In September 2020 the CDC issued a nation-wide residential eviction moratorium in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The CDC eviction moratorium stopped evictions for non-payment. In Texas several landlords filed suit challenging the legal authority of the federal government to impose an eviction moratorium upon states.

The judge ruled that while states have the power to regulate residential evictions, the CDC moratorium exceeded federal authority to regulate interstate commerce. States have broad power to enact laws for the general public good—called ‘police power’—but the police power of the federal government is limited under the US Constitution.

The federal government has no general police power. The federal government must find authority either under an area reserved to it under the Constitution, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce.

The Court noted that the “federal government cannot say it has ever before invoked its power over interstate commerce to impose a residential eviction moratorium” and that the federal government had not done so during the Spanish Flu pandemic or the Great Depression. “The federal government has not claimed such a power at any point during our Nation’s history until last year.”

The government claimed broad constitutional authority. The federal government argued it had authority to issue suspend evictions even in the absence of a pandemic for any reason, including an agency’s views on “fairness.”

Note that the impact of this ruling is limited as it is the holding of a local federal district court judge, and even within its jurisdictional boundaries, the Court did not issue an injunction. Any landlord should consult with an attorney before acting, particularly as there are potential criminal penalties for violating the CDC moratorium.

An appeal is highly anticipated.

[1] Terkel et al. v. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, No. 6:20 -cv- 00564 (E.D. Texas February 25, 2021).

Evicted by Matthew Desmond, a Review

A woman moves slowly, looking overcome as she answers the door for the sheriff deputy and moving-crew. A sob breaks through her face as she open the refrigerator and sees the movers have cleaned out everything, even the ice trays. At another eviction, the mother named in the court order had died two months prior. The children had gone on living in the rental by themselves with ratty mattresses and roaches scaling the walls. The landlord changed the locks. No one in the crew knew where the children would go, and they did not ask. A week earlier a man being evicted told the sheriff deputy to give him a minute. Then he shut the door and shot himself in the head.

In the Pulitzer Prize-winning Evicted Matthew Desmond paints a compelling portrait of the agonizing human toll eviction exacts. Desmond seasons anecdotes gleaned from living with landlords and tenants in Milwaukee’s low-income neighborhoods with enough data to show he has done his homework, but not too much to risk boring the reader.

Desmond’s non-judgmental approach lends much to his credibility. No zealot labeling good guys and bad guys, he instead writes that landlords are not “so different from the rest of us.” If given the same business “opportunity would any of us price an apartment at half of what it could fetch or simply forgive and forget losing thousands of dollars when the rent checks don’t arrive?” he rhetorically asks. At the same time, he writes candidly about some tenants being their own worst enemies with substance abuse and other issues.

The truth is far more nuanced than blaming some tenants for their own plight. Desmond argues that housing affordability and the resulting high eviction rate has gotten worse over several decades because of a complex web of public policies and socio-economic trends.

He shows how low-income people are at great risk of falling into a vicious cycle. If half or more of your income goes to housing, it is easy to fall behind—often for reasons that are not blameworthy at all. Once your behind if you find yourself under threat of eviction and take off from work to look for new housing, you lose income and are at greater risk of being fired. Displaced children fall behind in school and suffer emotional trauma, putting them in jeopardy of falling into a generational poverty trap. And so it goes.

So, do we reach for a Bolshevik abolishment of private rental housing? Hardly. Desmond recognizes that economic incentives to provide housing are a vital part of any solution. “If we are going to house most low-income families in the private rental market, then that market must remain profitable,” Desmond writes. Quoting a source from some 125 years ago, Desmond postulates “The business of housing the poor, if it to amount to anything, must be a business…As a charity, pastime, or fad, it will miserably fail, always and everywhere.”

He urges solutions such as no-cost legal representation for low-income tenants facing eviction, and universal housing vouchers to all who financially qualify, rather then putting most low-income applicants on a waiting list for housing vouchers as is done now. We do not put people on a waiting list for food stamps, nor do we vilify grocery stores for not handing out free food to the hungry.

Rather than display a partisan’s intransigence, Desmond acknowledges that the policies he advocates—like all policies—may have both pros and cons, and welcomes an honest debate. “Would a universal housing program be a disincentive to work? It is a fair and important question.”

Yet not addressing the housing crises, he urges, is far worse than possible side effects of universal housing vouchers and other possible solutions.

A compelling read, Evicted is the product of years of embedded research. The Gates Foundation has granted Matthew Desmond funds to continue research into the causes of high housing costs, even if lower-income areas. Could a sequel be in the works?

New CDC Eviction Moratorium

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) issued an eviction moratorium covering essentially all residential properties. To qualify for protection the tenant must provide the landlord with a declaration under penalty of perjury that the tenant

  1. has used best efforts to obtain all available government assistance for rent or housing;
  2. expect to earn for 2020 no more than $99,000 for individuals or $198,000 for joint tax filers;
  3. is unable to pay the full rent due to substantial loss of income, loss of work hours, wages, lay-off, or extraordinary out-of-pocket medical expenses;
  4. is making best efforts to pay as close to full payment as circumstances permit;
  5. eviction would likely make the tenant homeless or forced the tenant to move in close quarters in a shared-living arrangement;

The CDC argues in its moratorium that preventing evictions will help slow the spread of COVID-19. It cites this argument as giving the CDC authority to issue the eviction moratorium.

The CDC moratorium does not apply to evictions based on a tenant

  1. engaging in criminal activity;
  2. threatening health or safety;
  3. damaging or posing an immediate and significant threat to property;
  4. violating building or health codes or similar laws;
  5. violating contractual obligations other than non-payment of rent or other charges

The CDC moratorium is set to expire December 31, 2020.

 

New York Eviction Moratorium Challenge Dismissed

A federal judge struck down constitutional challenges to Governor Cuomo’s eviction moratorium orders.

The moratorium allows tenants to apply security deposits to rent provided the tenant replenishes the funds on a defined schedule, and temporarily prohibits landlords from starting an eviction against tenants facing financial hardship related to the pandemic.

The Governor’s Orders did not address then pending eviction cases, but as the Court pointed out the New York state courts closed in March and all eviction cases were suspended.

The first moratorium temporarily paused all evictions regardless of grounds.  A later order clarified that evictions on grounds other than non-payment against tenants experiencing financial hardships could proceed.

A group of landlords sued Governor Cuomo in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the orders on various legal theories. The Court dismissed the case in a summary judgment ruling.

The Court noted as background that evicting a tenant in New York, especially a residential tenant, is slow, cumbersome and extremely tenant-favorable process, especially when compared to analogous procedures in other states.

The Court noted several times in its opinion the temporary nature of the New York eviction moratorium. “[T]here is nothing permanent about [the eviction moratorium order]; it expires on August 19.”

The Court reasoned that the moratorium does not forgive rent, and landlords will be able to attempt to collect and/or evict tenants once the moratorium expires. “As long as the order is in place, tenants will continue to accrue arrearages, which the landlord will be able to collect with interest once the Order has expired. Furthermore, landlords will regain their ability to evict tenants once the Order expires.”

The Court pointed out that landlords “can still initiate eviction proceedings against the tenants who are not facing financial hardship but who have chosen not to pay their rent” and “will be able to move against their other tenants after August 19.”

The Court reasoned that the moratorium is not a regulatory taking because landlords still retain many economic benefits of ownership such as collecting rent from tenants not facing financial hardship and collecting security deposit funds from tenants affected by the pandemic.

The Court stated that the law is clear that “state governments may, in times of emergency or otherwise, reallocate economic hardships between private parties, including landlords and their tenants, without violating” the US Constitution.

Download a copy of the Court’s opinion.

New York Landlord-Tenant Attorneys

[businessdirectory-listings tag="New York evictions" title="New York Landlord-Tenant Attorneys"]

Landlords Sue City of Los Angeles

Many landlords “have mortgages on their properties that they are unable to pay without a steady stream of rental income.” Landlords “rely on rental income to maintain and secure their properties and pay employees, among other operating and personal expenses, including payment for food and housing for their own families.” Landlords are “also required to pay the substantial property taxes, utility fees and other assessments on their respective properties, which taxes, fees and assessments cannot be paid in the absence of rental income.” Many “cannot financially survive if a significant number of their tenants do not pay rent for a prolonged period of time.”

These are some of the allegations landlords raise in a complaint filed in US District Court challenging the Los Angeles Eviction Moratorium as violating both the California and US constitutions.

Landlords assert that the Eviction Moratorium will put many landlords “out of the rental business, either through foreclosure and/or bankruptcy, ultimately reducing the badly needed supply of rental housing within the City and further driving up the cost of housing.” According to the plaintiffs, the “City was fully aware of this when enacting the Eviction Moratorium, with some officials openly hoping to convert private distressed properties to public housing.”

The City of Los Angeles Eviction Moratorium prohibits “landlords and property owners from initiating or continuing residential eviction proceedings based upon non-payment of rent” but “does not require tenants to provide notice, let alone documentation, of their inability to pay.”

Tenants “may continue to occupy their respective premises at no charge, utilizing the water, power, trash, sewage, and other fees that the landlords must continue to pay without reimbursement.

While the LA Eviction Moratorium “ostensibly only applies if a tenant is unable to pay due to circumstances related to the Pandemic” in reality “it does not require tenants to provide notice, let alone documentation, of their inability to pay.”

Landlords have no process in which to challenge the tenant’s asserted inability to pay. But, the Eviction Moratorium “creates a private right of action in favor of only tenants whereby tenants are allowed to sue for alleged violations of the moratorium, subjecting landlords to civil penalties of up to $15,000 per violation.” (Emphasis originally in plaintiffs’ Complaint.)  

So, “while the Eviction Moratorium bars” landlords from evicting tenants “it provides a new weapon for tenants to use against landlords.”

It is “unlikely that tenants who do not pay rent during the” pandemic “will be in a position to pay back rent, in addition to their normal rent.”  Yet the City gives tenants a grace period that will extend for twelve months beyond the declared pandemic emergency “irrespective of the tenant’s ability to pay some or all rent, the term of the lease, any agreed plan or schedule for repayment, or any evidence demonstrating that the tenant will actually be capable of paying back rent at the expiration of the one-year grace period.”

While landlords can theoretically eventually sue tenants for back, the likelihood of ever actually collecting many months of back rent is minimal, at best. For tenants who move during the moratorium period, there is essentially no chance for landlords to recover rent. If they were to try, the landlords would incur tremendous (and likely unrecoverable) litigation expenses.

These are some of the allegations and arguments made by landlords in their lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the LA Eviction Moratorium. The landlords conclude that “as well-intentioned as [the Eviction Moratorium] may be” it has the effect of jeopardizing the “businesses and livelihoods” of landlords, and by driving some landlords out of business may take rental properties off the rental market, increasing rental housing scarcity.

If you are a California landlord or tenant, see our landlord-tenant lawyer directory to find legal counsel.

Portland Passes Tenant Screening Restrictions

The Portland, Oregon city council recently passed new laws restricting landlords in screening for rental applicants.

Landlords must give 72 hours notice before accepting applications, then are required to accept the first qualified applicant. The income and credit score requirements landlords may use are capped. Landlords’ use of criminal background checks is limited.

The new laws are aimed addressing homelessness and housing affordability. Critics argue the new laws will drive some landlords out of the market, making rents more expensive and exacerbating the problems.