US Court of Appeals Holds CDC Eviction Moratorium Likely Invalid

In September 2020 the Center for Disease Control (CDC) issued a nation-wide eviction moratorium,  citing generic rulemaking authority under the Public Health Service Act. The same month, landlords in Tennessee filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the CDC eviction moratorium exceeded statutory authority.

The Public Health Service Act statute authorizes the CDC Director to provide for “inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.” The CDC based its authority to supersede state law and halt evictions nation-wide on the “other measures” catchall.

Later, Congress extended the CDC eviction moratorium from December 31 to January 31. On January 29, the CDC extended the eviction moratorium through March 31, relying again on the generic catchall as authority.

The federal district court ruled that the CDC had exceeded its statutory authority. The government appealed and moved for a stay on the district court’s order.[1] The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the government was unlikely to prevail on the merits, and denied the motion.[2]

The Court reasoned that as the “other measures” catchall comes at the end of a list of specific items, the “other measures” catchall must be construed to be of the same nature as the specified items like “inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination” and so on. “Plainly, government intrusion on property to sanitize and dispose of infected matter is different in nature from a moratorium on evictions.”

The Court noted that regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship has historically always been the province of the states, and the Court would not read the statute as granting the CDC power to insert itself in a traditional area of state law without “some clear, unequivocal textual evidence of Congress’s intent to do so.” The Court cited an “ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”

The government argued that since other provisions of the Public Health Service Act allow the CDC to enforce quarantines, the “other measures” catchall must be read broadly to include things like quarantine. The Court conceded that this argument has “cosmetic appeal” but concluded that it does not hold up to scrutiny. The Court reasoned that the provision the government relied upon dealt with limited power to restrict liberty by imposing quarantines. The “other measures” language is found in provisions dealing with property interest, and an eviction moratorium is radically different from the types of property interests listed there.

The government also argued that when Congress legislatively extended the CDC eviction moratorium it acknowledged that the statute authorized the moratorium. The Court noted that nothing in the congressional act expressly approved the CDC’s interpretation, and “mere congressional acquiescence in the CDC’s assertion” of statutory authority “does not make it so, especially given that the plain text indicates otherwise.”

The Court found the government unlikely to prevail on the merits, and accordingly denied the motion for a stay on the district court’s order.

[1] Tiger Lily, LLC v. US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (6th Cir. No. 21-5256).

[2] See https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0074p-06.pdf